

# THE TROUBLE WITH DEMOCRACY

POLITICAL MODERNITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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## **6 Political Modernity, Democracy and State–Society Relations in Latin America: A New Socio-Historical Problématique?**

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### **Does Latin America exist?**

When dealing with modernity and the political in Latin America, in the sense given to both terms in this book, an initial question is related to the concept of the region under consideration. For some observers, the process of globalisation led to very different forms of insertion into it and answers to it, so that it is not possible to speak of Latin America in general and we should instead distinguish between the Southern cone countries, Brazil being the central and fundamental one there; the Central American countries; Mexico, more tied to the North American pole; and the Andean countries that have lived most intensely the problems of destruction and recomposition of the matrix of the national-popular state, to which I will refer later.<sup>1</sup> In such a view, these countries cannot be seen today as affected by a single common problématique and, consequently, 'Latin America' would disappear as a historic expression with a 'real' content, beyond the purely rhetorical or imaginary.

Here, instead, we will insist on the idea of Latin America, without entering into the eternal discussion, coming from the international organisations, about which countries or types of countries to include or not under this label. The reason to defend, in a globalised world, the idea of countries, societies, nations or national and multinational states, and the idea of Latin America, is not only affective or historical. It is based on the insight that it is impossible to conceive of the insertion in the globalisation processes by each country separately. Beyond all the vicissitudes Europe is currently experiencing, a very strong message or signal emerges from there: the affirmation that globalisation and this century's world will develop in a complex game of nation-states and supranational blocks, in which there is no destiny for countries that do not enter into a block – with the

exception of those few countries that comprise each such a large share of the world population that they can avoid block formation.

Latin American societies, beyond the rhetoric of regional integration, are facing hard decisions in issues such as energy, environment, knowledge society, new strategic branches of the economy, in all of which a substantial leap in the process of autonomous insertion is necessary if the countries do not want to be condemned to the periphery. Certainly there are temptations in some countries to avoid the question by saying that our major partner, the United States of America, is in our block, or by seeing oneself as similar in magnitude to the United States and thus capable of isolated development, as happened during certain times with Brazil. But let us recall that current globalisation at its origins had two characteristics that are not essential parts of every process of globalisation and have changed today, but reflected the real power situation in the world at the time. The first is geopolitical: it consisted in the unilateral hegemony of the United States though weakened in the following years. The second is ideological as well as socio-economic and was based in the hegemony of the neoliberal model. Given these two features it was impossible that single countries could integrate themselves into the globalisation dynamic without a growing process of fragmentation and loss of identity and cohesion. The condition for an autonomous integration into the global world is, as the Europeans have shown us, some kind of unity through big blocks or spaces consisting of several state-nations, including the idea of multinational states. In the light of current structural transformations, and in contrast with the experiences in earlier centuries, these blocks will be more pronouncedly models of cultural modernity than of a geopolitical dimension based on military power or even a geo-economic dimension based on markets.<sup>2</sup>

So, there is no future for Latin American societies without the constitution of a solid block among their states and nations. Important advances have been made during past years in trying to organise the region in more political terms, less based on pure economic trade agreements. But still the main problem is the lack of a general vision that combines the necessary reinforcement of each national state capacity with the acceptance of the common destiny of all these societies. Thus, we affirm that it is possible to speak of Latin America, in a constant tension between a differentiated empirical reality and a common or collective project, and we will affirm the possibility of thinking a socio-historical problématique, which shows specificities for each country, but which connects with the 'political'<sup>3</sup> common to all of Latin America. In analytical terms, this means that we pursue something akin to an ideal-type analysis, which neither considers

single countries nor elaborates intra-regional typologies, but emphasises features common across Latin America, even though with different degrees of development or different temporal sequences.

### The classic state-society relations in the twentieth century

The classical model of relations between state and society – what we have called, in ideal type terms, state-national-popular socio-political matrix<sup>4</sup> – prevailed in most of the more developed Latin American countries, though not in all, from roughly the 1930s to the 1960s/1970s. The main features of this matrix were: its socio-economic base was import-substituting industrialisation, in which the state, defined as 'state of compromise'<sup>5</sup> (including contradictory interests of competing sectors like oligarchy, bourgeoisie, middle and organised working classes, and excluding peasants and urban poor), had a leading role and was not only the main development agent, but also the main reference of the collective action of the masses that were incorporated into the national life. At the political level, what some authors have called a hybrid formula prevailed: sometimes authoritarian, sometimes formally democratic with cycles of authoritarianism and democracy, or authoritarian elements within democratic regimes, or democratic components within rather authoritarian regimes. This socio-political matrix existed in a historical-structural context characterised by the contradicting confluence of nationalist, developmental, modernising processes, at the same time as an industrialisation oriented towards the internal market with a central role of the state, a leading presence with oligarchic and middle-class components, and intense processes of popular mobilisation in which politics constituted the main axis.

During this period Latin American societies developed, in various forms, a relationship of fusion, imbrications and subordination between the state, the system of representation and the social actors. In some countries, the fusion between these elements was achieved through the figure of the populist leader, in others through the identification between state and political party or upon the articulation between social organisation and political-party leadership. There was also the case where the party system fused all the social fractions or the corporate organisations captured the totality of collective action without leaving room for autonomous political life.

In this classical matrix, as we said, the state was the point of reference for all collective action, be it development, social mobility and mobilisation, redistribution, the integration of popular sectors. But

it was a state with a weak autonomy from society and upon which weighed all the pressures and demands, both internal and external. This interpenetration between state and society gave to politics a central role. Aside from exceptional cases, it was more a mobilising than a representational politics, and the institutions of representation were, in general, the weakest part of the matrix. The 'statist' principle present in the whole of society was not always accompanied by an institutional autonomy of the state and its effective capacity for action.

These so-called national-popular regimes<sup>6</sup> showed more populist expressions in some countries and more partisan expressions in others, but they all reached breaking point during the 1960s through revolutionary radicalisation, on one side, and on the other, through the military or authoritarian responses coming from the dominant national sectors and the USA; and they collapsed precisely with the triumph of authoritarian alternatives through the Southern-cone military dictatorships or the authoritarian hardening where no actual military dictatorships were put in place.

The revolutionary movements of the 1960s criticised the dependent capitalism, the mesocratic hegemony and the inability of this model to satisfy popular interests. The military regimes that began in Brazil in 1964 sought to eliminate the popular mobilisation in its reformist, populist or revolutionary dimensions and to recompose capitalism in a kind of repressive counter-revolution from above based in an alliance between the military, dominant societal sectors and the political right from inside and from the USA.<sup>7</sup> In the 1980s and 1990s, the processes of political democratisation and of structural adjustments and economic reforms, in turn, coincided with the recognition of the void left by the disarticulation of the old matrix. It had not been replaced by another stable and coherent configuration of the relations between state and society. Different substitutes tended to install themselves in this void, making impossible the strengthening, autonomy and complementarity between the components of the matrix (state, regime and political actors, social actors or civil society), either eliminating one or two of them, or subordinating them, or emphasising exclusively only one of them.

### Changes at the end of the century

Four main changes occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century in Latin America, in different moments and degrees across the region. The first was the dominance of political-institutional models of consensus and conflict that tend to replace the dictator-

ships, civil wars and revolutionary modalities of previous decades. The second was the exhaustion both of the model of 'inward development', and of its replacement with formulas of adjustment and stabilisation, based on the so-called 'Washington consensus', a set of policies that seek new forms of insertion into the world economy, characterised by phenomena of globalisation and transnationalisation of the market forces.<sup>8</sup> The third was the transformation of the social structure, with an increment in inequality, poverty and marginality and the precariousness of the educational and labour systems, even after new educational reforms, but also important policies to overcome some of these deficits. All this has produced a recomposition of the system of social actors and a questioning of the traditional forms of collective action. Finally, the model of modernity associated with Western modernisation and the North American mass culture that was predominant in our societies or at least among the leading elites, entered into crisis, and in response indigenous and hybrid formulas of modernity were proposed.

A more profound change that affects the entire world, and in a specific way the Latin American societies, lies behind these transformations. The phenomena of globalisation and expansion of the principles of identity and citizenship, among others, produced a disarticulation of what was the predominant societal type, the national-state industrial society, although with different degrees of development according to the concrete historical societies.<sup>9</sup> This type was organised around labour and politics (in Latin America, especially the latter) and around processes of social change defined as modernisation, industrialisation and development, and its fundamental social actors were classes, parties and social movements.

Latin American societies, in different degrees and forms, can indeed be said to have never completely achieved such national-state industrial society, but although being less defined by that structure, they saw themselves as moving towards this society of reference in a process called development and social integration. These societies were always torn between their national-state industrial society project and a fragmented, hybrid blend of different civilisational worlds within each society and the permanent exclusions of indigenous and poor sectors. Today, without being an integrated national-state industrial society, that is, a particular historical-cultural variant of this type of society, Latin American societies face the challenge to become also a historical-culturally specific and original combination between that type and the post-industrial globalised societal type. This transformation redefines the roles of politics and states, the central actors of social change and the concept itself of development, as different theories and institutions have been proposing.<sup>10</sup>

All these changes point towards a transformation of the matrix of constitution of society, or the socio-political matrix, in Latin America. In fact, there is a dislocation of society related to, evidently, the processes of globalisation and the shift from a socio-economic model of development based on industrialisation and the leading role of state to a model which will emphasise mainly the insertion in global markets, the financial dimension and the central role of transnational markets, usually accompanied by extreme ideologies such as neoliberalism. But at this point no new model of development was built, because what happened was the disarticulation of the previous model without its replacement by a new one in any coherent way. This change in the development model, from the developmentalist projects of popular national states to much more liberal or neoliberal models, and then the search for a new one that overcomes inequalities and replaces neoliberalism, was accompanied by a cultural transformation with the raising of gender, ethnic and regional identities among others, but also individualistic tendencies.<sup>11</sup>

### The changing role of politics

At least two important socio-cultural transformations that pervade societies all over the world affect the role of politics which has been so crucial in the constitution of Latin American societies.<sup>12</sup> In the first place, new forms of capitalism, both in the production and in its development models, have produced a dissociation between economy, politics, culture and social organisation, where each one of these dimensions acquires its own dynamic in relation, in part, to diverse forms of globalisation. This apparently leaves the society without a 'centre' (as was the national state) or without a 'cement' (as was politics) that co-ordinated or articulated the different dimensions. Consequently the society as a political community, as a *polis*, is weakened, and various partial 'centres', especially de facto powers, appear competing with the national state or reducing its role and space.

On a psycho-social and cultural level, secondly, we live in a time in which we produce and will continue to produce an expansion of subjectivity as a principle and reference of social life, with the search for meaning and happiness acquiring predominant roles. This implies, on the one hand, the de-institutionalisation of social life, which can be seen, among other dimensions, in the deep transformations and diversification of the family institution. This is accompanied by the de-normativisation of individual behaviours and the personalisation and intersubjectivation of ethics. On the other hand, ideological

movements that united individual and group projects with the collective destiny of society and that provided utopias and a complete architecture for it seem to have disappeared. It is not that the ideologies or the utopias themselves disappeared, just that they lose their all-encompassing nature and move on to being tentative and partial principles to manage change and to seek more human forms of personal and collective life.<sup>13</sup>

All of this necessarily influences the redefinition of politics in Latin America. In the classical socio-political matrix, politics played a decisive role, as we stated. Politics as a means of access to goods and services of the modern society, politics understood in its representative or clientelistic elements, in its dimension of vindication and satisfaction of interests and access to state, whether for employment, education, housing, social security or health; but also politics in its dimension of collective project and source of meaning, i.e., its ideological or cultural dimension. The source of meaning for collective action was found less in identities or individual aspirations, as seems to be the case nowadays, than in ideologies that sought not only to represent but also to mobilise around the idea of a project, of a future that could be reached through struggle and conflict. Politics thus understood was somehow the cultural cement of society. Where capitalism was unable to provide a complete rationality for the co-existence of different modes of production, where other dimensions, even the cultural one, were unable to provide for the unity of the national state, there was politics.

To put it simply, during the 1960s and 1970s the view was common that the world could be 'changed', and changed through politics. In this sense, in the society of national-popular states, the emblematic actor – sometimes empirically real, sometimes imaginary – was *el pueblo* (the people), originally incarnated as the working class and its political expressions, but when it was felt that the working class was incorporated into the system, it was replaced by other actors such as peasants or, in some cases, the student movement or the party organisation itself, especially at the time when the leftist parties were militarised and transformed in guerrilla movements. In contrast, in the latter part of the twentieth century, the idea that became dominant is that the world cannot be changed, at least not through politics. And this has to do, on one hand, with the expansion of subjectivity and also individualism, the appearance of new cleavages and the emergence of identities from other sources than politics, the weakening of the role of the state as provider of goods and collective meaning, new forms of sociability and communications, and on the other hand, with the disappearance of what might be called a central social movement, a movement that aims at the transformation of

society and that defines its basic conflict from the point of view of a project of society.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the key question is not the discrediting of politics that indeed exists but has been overemphasised by the media, but the change of the meaning of politics in society, how it affects the political actors and the particular process of decomposition or recomposition of political parties or party systems in some countries.

### Success and deficits of political democratisation

Historically, democratic practice and thought in Latin America were characterised by the contamination between political democracy and social democratisation. The military dictatorships in the Southern Cone and, in other places, the authoritarian components of regimes that could not be defined as properly military, are a landmark that provoked a mutation in the political life and the theoretical reflection on the matter. Human rights and democracy, the latter seen as the political order able to consecrate the former and avoid the rise of any power to suppress them, became a goal in itself and crucial object of social struggles.

The processes to replace military dictatorships or authoritarian regimes ended more than two decades ago and are not the central political processes any more.<sup>15</sup> In other words, the great crises of formal authoritarian regression seem to be controlled, with very few exceptions. But this does not mean that the political democratisation processes have been completely successful. Their pending tasks will have to be fulfilled in the context of social and political processes that cannot be reduced to classic political institutions.

The record of political democratisation, thus, has two very different dimensions. On the one hand, and with a few significant exceptions, electoral democracy is working and the acceptance of democracy as the best political regime in which to live prevails – and this is an entirely new reality in Latin American societies.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, frustration about the capacity of democracy to effectively change the power relations in society led to severe criticism of what is called the ‘political class’ and to the search for new formulae like participatory or direct democracy and mobilisations that express real democratic exercise.<sup>17</sup>

Beyond the analysis of democratisation processes, what the Latin American case shows is the weakness and troubles of democratic theory in some historical contexts. Such theory was classically thought for one type of society, for a *polis*. And a *polis*-society is a space where an economic system, a political organisation, a model of identity and cultural diversity and a social structure co-exist, even if

in contradictory ways. Today, this *polis* finds itself exploded by processes that have to do with globalisation, local and ethnic identities, public spaces that overflow the limits of a country, among others, which diminish the margins for manoeuvre of national states, conditioning them and penetrating societies. And this accounts for what we will call the new Latin American socio-historical *problématique*, namely the reconstruction of the political community or of new relations between state and society.

### New actors and social movements

During the national-populist period, populism was the predominant form of collective action; and the cultural orientations were of mesocratic-popular, nationalist and developmentalist kinds. In the classical matrix, the social actors exert pressure on the state via political action, be it class-based or populist or mediated by parties or corporations or in a personalised way. The central social actor can be defined as the National-Popular Movement, and it identified itself as part of *el pueblo*,<sup>18</sup> the latter being the only subject of history. The paradigmatic social actor or movement of the National-Popular Movement was generally the workers’ movement, but in various periods this leadership was questioned and replaced by referring to different actors, such as the peasants or the students or the vanguard parties.

The military dictatorships of the 1980s entailed profound consequences for the social actors and the forms of collective action.<sup>19</sup> On the one side, there was the search for the reconstruction of the social fabric that had been destroyed by the authoritarianism and the economic reforms; on the other side, during authoritarian regimes until their very end, the orientation of collective actions, even sectorial and not particularly political ones, had become politicised. Owing to the repressive character of the dictatorships, the main collective actions were social mobilisations that tended to emphasise the symbolic over the claiming and instrumental dimension. In this sense, the leading symbolic role of the Human Rights Movement is telling. It was the seed of what we can call the central social movement of the period of rupture with the national-popular matrix under the authoritarian regimes: the democratic movement.<sup>20</sup>

The processes of political democratisation tended to separate collective action according to three logics that pervaded all particular social actors. The first one is the political logic orientated towards establishing a consolidated democracy as a precondition for any other kind of claim. The second one is the particular logic of each

single actor oriented towards concrete benefits in social democratisation as a precondition for actively supporting the new democratic regime. The third logic criticises the insufficient nature of the institutional changes and conceives democracy as a more profound social change extended to other dimensions of society.

The existence of unresolved ethical questions during the transitions or democratisations, in particular the violation of human rights during the dictatorships, sustained the importance of the human rights movements at the onset of the new democracies. But these movements saw their activities severely limited by restrictions emanating from other authoritarian enclaves, be those of institutional kind or by powerful social actors (the military, business, paramilitary groups), in particular because of the risk of authoritarian regression and economic crises. These risks gave political actors, both in government and in opposition, the key roles in social action, thus subordinating the principles of other actors to their own logic. In turn, the tasks connected with the consolidation process privileged at the beginning the necessities and requirements of economic adjustment and stabilisation over collective action that was thought of as putting at risk this process.

The socio-economic transformations after the democratisation or transition processes and the concomitant political and cultural changes profoundly modified the landscape of social actors. Classical actors lost part of their social significance, while those that emerged around the new post-authoritarian issues did not succeed in constituting themselves as stable actors or as a corpus of citizens, appearing rather as contingent publics or pressure groups. Thus, earlier forms of recurrent social action tended to be replaced, on the one hand, by sporadic mobilisations and fragmentary and defensive actions, sometimes in the shape of social networks, significant but with a low political institutionalisation and representation, sometimes as consumerist reactions against neoliberal measures. On the other hand, the scene is taken by the aggregation of individuals through the phenomenon of public opinion, measured through polls and mediated by the mass media, not by mobilising or representative organisations.

The dismantling of the classical matrix at the end of the democratic transitions generated a situation in which a unifying principle of social action had disappeared and in which, on the contrary, principles diversify and in some cases even enter in contradiction (environment versus growth, to name just one example), each one of them expressing itself in different actors. This meant the disappearance of the central social movement and the inability to replace it by any other, but rather by a multiplicity of movements. The historic role played by the popular movements – the working class or peasantry

in some countries or, in other cases, the student movement or the *pobladores* – found no equivalent in the new situation, which was marked on the one hand by new social movements of an identitarian type, and on the other by collective initiatives and mobilisations that are defined generically as citizen movements.

With regard to the latter, the concept of citizenship has undergone a process of reinvention, for it covers almost any claim or demand in a normative sense.<sup>21</sup> Currently it maintains an individual basis, not linked to a collective subject, society being seen as an aggregate of individual rights. Thus, any claim to a right is made without a counterpart in the concept of ‘citizenry’, where rights are derived from membership in the *polis* and belonging to a collective body, accompanied by duties. The new understanding of ‘citizen’ tends to abandon the concept of ‘pueblo’, the ‘citizenry’ dimension, and leaves only the individual, the ‘citizenship’ dimension, in its place. The processes of globalisation, neoliberal reform, and new technologies of communication are undermining the idea of *polis*, namely a territorial space in which there is an economy, polity, culture, social structure with one centre of decision which is called the state, and a relationship between the people and the state which is called politics. So the idea of the citizen tends to be reduced to the status of an individual, holder or owner of all rights, without duties or other links than the constant demand for such rights. Undoubtedly, there is an extremely positive element in the revaluation of the citizenship concept, where intermediate actors such as parties and social movements tend to weaken, but there is an individualistic residue that tends to be transferred and used by the mass media and the informatics network that becomes the public space, where the figure of the citizen tends to be reduced to the figure of the consumer, or of a participant in the networks or public opinion, partly created by the same mass media.<sup>22</sup> The citizen is thus defined in Macphersonian terms of possessive individualism, in which even the definition of rights is a definition in terms of property or ownership.<sup>23</sup>

Thus, the expansion and strengthening of citizenship accompanied by the weakening of the *polis* constitutes a paradox, which is expressed through the relative loss of the functions of the state as a regulator, leader and provider, and the weakening of the major social categories – working class, middle class, students, etc., all of them segmented and fragmented – and the replacement of the concepts of equality and social justice by the concept of equity, and the transformation of social movements, especially of the identitarian type, into collective bearers of demands, not necessarily assuming the *polis* as the place where they all come from and to which they all relate.

The new situation nevertheless contains a potential for a

redefinition of citizenship and a new way of conceiving collective action. The panorama of collective action during the last decade shows that the citizen dimension has been one of the main constitutive elements of such action and of the social actors in the region, reaching from the ethnic movements to the new features of the *pobladores* movements, the claims by the poor urban sectors, the neighbourhood organisations and the regional movements, youth movements, environmental mobilisations as well as movements against company closures. The strong irruption of the so-called 'civil society' in almost all areas of the globe during the last two decades appears to demonstrate that organisation around specific and concrete demands, but also for rights and identities, can be more effective in reaching solutions for the great social problems than political parties and the traditional channels of representation.<sup>24</sup>

In this sense, the identitarian orientation searches for more than rights claims, namely the affirmation of a social and political subject, of a 'we' based on an attribute, generally with an adscriptive character. Thus, the horizon opens towards the activities of movements that can convert themselves into vectors of wider and more urgent demands (such as in the case of the Bolivian coca-growers, student movements or environmental movements). The mobilisations in the street are an expression of this situation.

In the background of the anti-neoliberal mobilisations of a predominantly economic nature and tied to consumption, therefore, one can detect a refoundational dimension in the identitarian expressions linked to the constitution of a subject, in the citizen struggles for rights, often related to changes of government or in the defence of governments that are threatened by the *de facto* powers.<sup>25</sup> We see here the effects of the transformations that originated in the processes of globalisation, democratisation, the neoliberal reforms as well as other structural and cultural changes in the world, which have had profound impacts on the national-popular state matrix by fragmenting the state-society relations and by the economy gaining autonomy from politics in the neoliberal moment. Thus emerges a new historical *problématique* that we will address in what follows: the recomposition of state-society relations. This refoundational dimension, in sum, is centred in struggles over a model of modernity.<sup>26</sup> This is probably the most innovative dimension of collective action in Latin America over the past years, most visible in the new forms of indigenous action, in the mobilisations that led to new constitutions and even new forms of state, as in Bolivia, but also in the Chilean student movements of 2006 and 2011, whose refounding elements address not only the educational system but the relations between the political and the social.<sup>27</sup>

### A Latin American model of modernity?

By modernity, we understand the way in which a society constitutes its subjects. Modernity is the affirmation of subjects, individual or collective, builders of their own history; it is another way of talking about the self-determination and autonomy that is being emphasised in this book. Thus, the modernity of a society refers to the way in which social subjects are constituted, which in general tends to be a combination of rationality, subjectivity and historical-memory. Modernisation should be defined as the process by which each society constitutes its own modernity, without committing the mistake of identifying it with the processes of rationalisation, technologisation and secularisation particular to Western modernity in its European and North American varieties. In other words, modernisation, except for some historical models, is not necessarily determined by the rupture with tradition, nor by the productive system or the use of determined objects and instruments. It is not adequate to speak of 'modernity', but rather 'modernities' or 'models of modernity'. We cannot speak of 'the' modernisation, but of different processes that can fit, or not, within known modernisations.

The particular form of Latin American modernity around what we have called the national-popular state matrix is in crisis, and the aspiration to the model of modernity identified with specific processes of modernisation in developed countries, with a special emphasis on the North American consumption and mass culture model, appears as a counter-project. Opposing this, one can identify the vision of a Latin American modernity either with a 'deep' Latin America, based on its indigenous root, or on a social base that is racially mixed ('*mestizaje*') or with a particular subject that is the Catholic Church.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, the Latin American model of modernity, if it existed, combined embryonically several features: the construction of societies by the state; the domination or exclusion of the 'ethnic nation' by the 'civic nation',<sup>29</sup> an aspect that today is dramatically changing; the deficit of instrumental rationality; the crucial role of politics as the cohesive element of society; the vocation of social integration with a permanent memory of exclusion; the communitarian and egalitarian-democratic ethos subordinating the liberal one; the capacity of absorbing Western cultures and blending it with original elements, among others. Certain historical landmarks cross all Latin American societies, even with different chronological sequences and timing, such as: reaching independence with the exclusion of indigenous people; the creation of a national state without incorporating the entire society; the incorporation of a segmented working and middle class through cycles of democratisation and authoritarianism;



the search and failure of anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist revolutions; military dictatorship, neoliberalism, and transitions to democracy that consecrated democratic regimes all over the region.

As mentioned above, contemporary societies, and among them the Latin American ones, are going through transformations, to different extents, from a model of modernity based on the national-state industrial society to a societal type that combines the previous model with dimensions of globalised post-industrial society through the filter of cultural identities and historical memory that constitute them as national communities. While economic development no longer depends only on social and resource mobilisation on the part of the national state and actors organised around it, but also on the forces of transnational markets, at the same time, the notion of development as a process of transformation of a given society ceases to identify itself with the economic growth and includes all other dimensions of society, where the concept of quality of life, among others, exemplifies this complexity.

Therefore, modernity can no longer be defined by identifying it with historical models of modernisation or with one only of its variants, be it the most rationalist or instrumental one, the most subjective one, or only the historical memory of a national identity. Each society combines these three dimensions in a different way and 'invents' its own modernity. The question for Latin American societies is whether or not they will be able to construct their models of modernity, at the level of individual countries and the whole region, in order to enter autonomously into the globalised world.

During the commemorations of the bicentennials of independence we have witnessed contradictory celebrations between those who see in the post-independence history the affirmation of national identities and wills, and those who, instead, see no reason to celebrate because such history has been one of domination and imposition of wills by external and domestic powers. The first vision is related to the processes of modernisation, development, revolution, social and political democratisation. The large deficit in the construction of these societies as socio-economic and political communities is behind the other vision, the best synthesis of which is the idea, mentioned above, that the ethnic nation was subjugated by the civic one.

We can find here again the debate about models of modernity, supported also by the social sciences. Since the birth of the social sciences as academic disciplines in the region, in fact, a concern for Latin American society has prevailed over the search for general theories of society and collective behaviour. The social sciences – especially sociology, which was the predominant discipline for a couple of decades – were dominated by an analysis of social change in which develop-

ment and modernisation were specific forms of social change in Latin America. The response to structural-functionalist approaches to this problem, theoretically expressed mainly in Marxism and analytically in the dependency approach, is a critical variant of a paradigm which emphasises the structural and political processes, analyses progress and failures, makes evaluations of what our societies have become, which in some cases turn out to be positive ones, and in others more negative ones.<sup>30</sup>

In a second paradigm, which has an anthropological and cultural root rather than a sociological or political one, the colonial reality was never overcome by these societies. Even social actors who express the gender, territorial, ethnic-cultural, or civil-society dimensions have always been oppressed by men, race, the metropolis, military or institutionalised politics, including the populist and leftist versions.<sup>31</sup> The emphasis here is not on the analysis of structures and processes, but on a vision of the fragmentations, the tears and the search of subjects, i.e., it is nearer to formulations of the 'multiple modernities' approach than the modernisation models. Here there are no evaluations, whether frustrated or optimistic, but the rejection of the history that is celebrated in the bicentennials.

Even in its most democratic and integrated moments or versions, Latin American modernity was, in fact, always marred by sectors that were excluded from the capacity to be a subject. Thus, this modernity did not merely create underdeveloped societies, but what in different moments and sometimes from contradictory points of view have been called, among other definitions, dual and structurally heterogeneous, disarticulated, colonial, dependent, hybrid societies.<sup>32</sup> The persistence of oligarchic forms and the socially partial democratisations, which were masking the reality of internal and external domination, impeded consistent and generalised processes of self-determination. We will now examine the hypothesis that today we are facing a new socio-historical *problématique* in which the convergence of the two visions mentioned above is possible.

### The new Latin American socio-historical *problématique*

The existence of a common *problématique* to all Latin America, which is expressed differently by each country, is an idea that has been questioned in recent times. The processes of globalisation, interpenetration of financial and communication markets, disarticulation of national communities and the weakening and, at the same time, strengthening of some state issues seem to stress the idea that we are

not in front of societies – in the classical sense of the term – but of processes, flows, networks, which define the contemporary world in a different way than the mainstream of the last two centuries: the national-state industrial society, whether capitalist or socialist.<sup>33</sup> In an opposite way, behind the idea of a socio-historical problématique of Latin America or of a specific country lies the affirmation – which looks, on the face of it, banal – that societies and countries prevail in spite of the existence of processes of globalisation. Then these societies or these countries can be defined not only in terms of a set of multiple axes of different problems and issues, but it is possible to find a core unit, a certain axis around which other axes can be ordered. That is the idea of a socio-historical problématique, which also implies a structural element that goes beyond a moment, situation or crisis, which some have called the medium or long duration. In this sense Latin American society today is less defined in terms of crisis, i.e., is less in the presence of a great conjuncture or short-term crisis, but rather faces a profound transformation in the socio-historical problématique of its countries.

When we speak of the transformation of a socio-historical problématique, we have in mind situations analogous to other profound historical transformations. In the nineteenth century, the problématique of these countries was the construction of independent national states. Later, the problématique of many countries in the 1920s and 1930s was the building of an inward model of development and the integration of the popular masses and the middle class, and the state playing the main role in the industrialisation processes after the debacle of the oligarchic order. The development problem in the 1950s and 1960s was radicalised since the Cuban revolution in terms of the problématique of the revolution, i.e., development no longer as modernisation but as the shift from a dependent capitalist society to a socialist society.<sup>34</sup> In recent decades, such transformation concerns the rise of democracy against dictatorships or the reinsertion into the globalised world, in which the role of the state is challenged by the transnational forces of markets.

The current Latin American socio-historical problématique includes, of course, development issues or the question of the construction of viable democratic regimes. But behind the persistently present issues of the last thirty or forty years there is a relatively new situation, which perhaps does not find the same expression in different countries but applies in some way to all of them. At the core of this new situation resides the issue of what ECLAC has called social cohesion and, in its 2010 report, equality.<sup>35</sup> And behind this issue lies the reorganisation of the bond between citizens and subjects members of the *polis*, between state and society, that is, the construc-

tion of a new socio-political matrix replacing the national popular and the neoliberal ones.

Ensuring the cohesion of a society means rebuilding relations between state and society, which were dismantled by the neoliberal processes, military dictatorships and the process of globalisation. The most dramatic expression of this is found in the Bolivian case, in which we are clearly in the presence of a refoundation of the nation-state. In Bolivia, unlike other cases, the new nation-state project is not identified with and must not be confused with the leader's personal project, even though it needs him. Beyond the emblematic cases, in each of our countries – be it the restructuring of the relationship between state and regions or provinces, a new constitution, inter-ethnic relations, new production systems to face globalisation, overcoming poverty that affects nearly half the population, demands for deliberative democracy and participation that complements representative democracy, legitimacy of the state across its territory, to name a few real and symbolic examples – we face the same issue of restructuring the relations between state and society in a globalised world and the generation of a new socio-political matrix or a new foundation of the nation-state.<sup>36</sup> This process does not exhaust itself, as we used to think in the past, with development processes or democracy, nor with economic reforms, even if it requires all of these dimensions.

This central problem has at least three levels: the local, the national-state and the supra-national level, the last one referring to Latin America as a regional block, as mentioned above, that will facilitate access to the globalised world for national societies. In terms of content, this reorganisation involves at least another three major dimensions. First, an ethical nucleus, without which no social cohesion or sense of belonging to the community can exist. This core or foundational ethical consensus is not subjected to the game of majorities or minorities; rather it constitutes what some call the common heritage or moral cohesion of society. It is not an ideology or a sealed package created to prevent cultural diversity, religious or otherwise, that may not be universal in society, but a set of principles, guidelines, orientations, aspirations that society has decided through history, which mark the horizon of meaning and the project of a country, so important that without it a country would not be more than a territory with a population. Today, this idea has universal roots – such as human rights – but also contains the learning processes by which society creates its tradition and history. This core is not the same across countries, although in the case of Latin America human rights issues, recognition and valuation of native peoples, appraisal of democracy, and the pursuit of equality and

solidarity seems always to be present, although in different formulations and intensities. In their declarative parts the constitutions of the modern world often enshrined these principles and also created institutions that respect and promote them. In our view, this was a deficient element in our history as countries, perhaps because there was an elite enforcement, involving very deep divisions and exclusions. Today the force of democracy, weak as it is, has made it possible to develop processes of construction and generalisation to the whole society of its shared ethical nucleus.

A second dimension is that of change in the structural and institutional foundations of a socio-economic community that prevent the co-existence of several countries inside one. This is, in short, the theme of equality and the role of the state to guarantee it. Equality means the establishment of a minimum and reasonable distance, always fluctuating, between the members of a society. This goes far beyond the vision that reduces the issue of equality in society to equal opportunities or equity. Indeed, equity does suppose a basic floor, a starting point and an individual basis. Equality and social justice do have a minimum and a maximum (a floor and a ceiling), and refer to social categories, and therefore the concept of equality requires redistribution of power and wealth and the intervention of an entity that makes the distribution: the state. As we have stated elsewhere,<sup>37</sup> if the absence of equity destroys individual lives, the absence of equality destroys the life of societies, creating different and juxtaposed worlds that cannot be recognised as part of a space or common project.<sup>38</sup> On one hand, this implies a redefinition of the production model, but on the other it requires the implementation of a redistributive formula in which the state plays a key role as a legitimate agent of redistribution. If equality is not part of the ethical nucleus to which we referred above, the legitimacy of a redistributive and protective state will be very weak.

Thirdly, the moral and structural reconstruction of society requires the reconstruction of the political community that is behind the political reforms that make representative democracy more accountable. New forms of participatory democracy must be developed to enable citizenship to control a necessarily intervening state.<sup>39</sup>

### The models at play

It is possible to analyse some political processes in Latin America at the start of the twenty-first century in the light of the new socio-historical *problématique* that we have outlined.<sup>40</sup>

We refer here to the emergence of leftist governments in the last

decade. If the central hypothesis of this work proves to be true, we could say that we are facing a non-conservative socio-historical issue; something more akin to tradition, actors and leftist sensibilities. The leftist governments are in office, in part, because they were the political forces that did not support the neoliberal transformations, but presented criticism and proposed solutions and corrective mechanisms of the socio-economic model after the ‘Washington consensus’.<sup>41</sup> It is uncertain how much of this alternative economic model, either in its more leftist variant or in the particular version of social democracy,<sup>42</sup> will be viable for the future. Voters can change their preferences, and in important countries like Mexico, Colombia and Chile in 2010, the right-wing parties won national elections.<sup>43</sup> The leftist governments try to overcome the neoliberal crisis and to expand social rights and social participation and diminish poverty. Their success depends not only on the answers to the demands of a population increasingly aware of their rights but, above all, on the deepening of democracy and, within this framework, the refounding of state–society relations.

Within this left turn in Latin America during the last decade, we witness different ways of coping with the new socio-historical *problématique* and the emergence of a probably new central social movement or subject. Each of these models tends to privilege one main subject of collective action: the leader, the party, a specific social (ethnic) movement, street citizenry, or the state.<sup>44</sup>

One of these models is based principally on politics, with two variants: one through more personalised or populist politics (Venezuela, Ecuador in the 2000s, Argentina at the beginning of the century) at the possible expense of institutions and some authoritarian inclination; the other through the party system (Uruguay and Chile in the 1990s, the latter only in its dimension of democratisation because other aspects of the jump to new state–society relations have hardly existed) at the possible expense of social actors and social movements.

Another model is the recomposition of the political community from the angle of society, of which there are also two variants. On the one hand, there is Bolivia in the middle of the 2000s where this reconstruction is done from a communitarian ‘we’, basically though not exclusively defined in ethnic terms, and where the problem emerges in the integration of the sectors that do not identify themselves with the ethnic ‘we’, but identify themselves with the idea of a country. On the other hand, and more as a trend experienced in many countries and actors without having a national case that specially fits with this variant, we find the prospect of Social Forums, in which society is reconstructed from civil society and from social movements and organisations that reject and distrust politics. Hence,

it is weak to establish itself as a viable project, despite its great international influence.

Finally, there is also the reshaping made by international organisations and national elites of Washington consensus, mixing what was called the first wave of neoliberal economic reforms with concepts of civil society and citizenship taken from the criticism of such reforms. Here, the reconstruction of countries is based on state-regulated markets, through public policies that respond to specific sectorial demands formulated on the basis of expert knowledge, which in the end replace politics. This is what we might call the technocratic model, which has been the influence of the World Bank and the IBD and developed by parties and governments that today constitute the new right.

Some of these models arose at a moment of a severe national crisis, either economic or political, and generated initially large consensus; some of them deteriorated either because of authoritarian excesses or because of the distance from existing institutions. All of them combine in different ways the political (parties and leadership), social (civil society and movements) and technocratic (state and expertise) dimensions, but mostly privilege one of them at the expense of the others. Lula's Brazil and Morales's Bolivia were the cases that combined all of them. We also always find again some of the aspects that characterised the classic national-popular modernity, like populism or fusion between different elements of the socio-political matrix.

In contrast to what the media and international organisations often suggest, what is currently at stake in Latin America is the reconstruction of political communities. That is why political and cultural components of the transformation dominate over the economic and market dimensions. At the same time, the historical attempts of recomposition, mentioned above as examples, do not necessarily mean successful refoundations; they can fail or lead to decompositions, authoritarian or conservative reactions, as the crisis of the beginning of the 2010 decade shows for some of them.

### Concluding remarks

The political and politics, both dimensions tied together along the twentieth century, have been the seal of the Latin American struggle for modernity. This is to say that political modernity is 'the' modernity in Latin America, the core of all modernity. This modernity has been expressed in specific stages or types of state-society relations, and it has been a torn modernity based on a dependent capitalism with strong inequalities and exclusions. The common model of modernity has for a long time been what we called the

national-popular state matrix. The different expressions of this political modernity were linked in some way to the Western *problématique* of development, modernisation or revolution. This entailed that the majoritarian centre or leftist orientations, including the more radical or revolutionary ones, did not express any search for other varieties of modernity coming from ethnic, regional or, later, gender dimensions that challenged the main vision including the one coming from the more radical left. The civic nation prevailed over the ethnic or 'deep' nation. Military dictatorships and a wave of authoritarianism disarticulated this model of modernity, trying to impose a more repressive version subordinated to the new tendencies of world capitalism and markets. Transitions and political democratisations consecrated democracy, for the first time in regional history, as the unique political regime in all the countries. In the context of this reality and of processes of globalisation, of neoliberal reforms and attempts to correct them, and of identitarian and also individualistic and citizen irruptions, four main tendencies seem to become predominant. Firstly is the rupture, indeed relative, between the political and politics which, secondly, leads to more cultural than economic or political ways to constitute subjects and actors. Thirdly, these new subjects are not necessarily linked to the classical variants of modernity in Latin America and tend to redefine development in terms of equality and better collective life, which implies new relations between state and society. Fourthly, this recomposition has today as its locus not only the local and national or multinational territories but also the region as a block, able to incorporate all these countries in the process of globalisation with voice, not exit, and without subordination to transnational powers.

As we have explored in other works, in the same way in which the main social actors in other epochs configured themselves around a determined historical *problématique* such as those of development, revolution or democracy, that marked all collective action and all orientations of the actors, so one can say today that collective action and the configuration of actors originates, in terms of its historicity, in the new *problématique* of reconstruction of the *polis*.<sup>45</sup> This *problématique* constitutes the central social movement, the main actors of which vary from country to country. In terms of the life-world (*lebenswelt*) and subjectivity, in turn, we witness a diversification of *problématiques* and sectorial demands that, beyond being new in the new structural and cultural context, do not acquire the classical forms of mediation and organisation known from the national-popular state matrix. If one considers the instrumental dimension in its organisational expression, we witness at the same time a weakening of the party-political linkage and the predominance of

communitarian forms of citizen or corporate association, while in its institutional expression, jointly with the respect for given institutional frames, one observes the search for new forms of participation and expression that go beyond the former ones but point towards their institutionalisation.

We are participating in a recomposition of social forces. The initially isolated collective action typical of the 1990s gains progressively in density. In other words, the actors pass gradually from the levels of the life-world (cultural) and the instrumentalities of organisations and institutions (economic and social) towards a 'hybrid' orientation into which a political dimension is incorporated. These changes affect the scope and the temporality of collective action and of organisational forms.

In the course of these processes the meaning of politics gets redefined, accompanied by criticism of, and distrust in, institutional politics. Much of the criticism directed at the democracies in the region expresses a profound questioning of the classical forms of politics.<sup>46</sup> But it would be a great error to interpret this distancing of important sectors of the population as the disappearance or the end of politics and as the predominance of extra-institutional or insurrectional action. In contrast to other periods, the refoundational dimension of collective action situates itself within the frame of acceptance of democratic institutionality, be it to question or even replace the same government that one had elected or mainly to modify the institutions radically. There is a search for new relations between politics and collective action: either through processes of relegitimation of politics in its classical party forms, or through the construction of new parties that express social movements, or through more autonomous expressions of civil society or more complex penetrations of the political apparatuses by the movements – with the evident risk of loss of autonomy for the latter.

In the new scenario generated by the social, structural and cultural transformations to which we have referred and which decompose the unity of society and *polis*, of society and nation-state, the exclusive centrality of politics as the expression of collective action tends to disappear. But politics acquires a new, more abstract centrality as it takes on the task of approaching and framing the various spheres of social life without destroying the latter's autonomy. Thus, there is a demand for 'meaning' in politics, which the market forces, the mediatic universe, the particularities and identities or the mere calculations of individual or corporate interest are unable to provide.

The redefinition of the relations between politics and society, both as meaning of collective action and as institutional and organisa-

tional arrangements, constitutes the nucleus of the struggle over modernity in Latin America today and in the future.

### Notes

1. On the concept of the socio-political matrix and its transformation in Latin America, see Manuel Antonio Garretón, Marcelo Cavarozzi, Peter Cleaves, Gary Gereffi and Jonathan Hartlyn, *Latin America in the 21st Century: Toward a New Sociopolitical Matrix* (Miami, FL: The North South Centre Press, 2003). In elaborating the following chapter I have drawn on several of my own works, mainly Manuel Antonio Garretón, *La Sociedad en que vivi(re)mos: Introducción sociológica al cambio de siglo* (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2001); *Incomplete Democracy: Political Democratization in Chile and Latin America* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003); 'Las dimensiones de la acción colectiva en América Latina', in Jaime Llambías Wolff (ed.), *Los nuevos desafíos para América Latina: Economía, equidad, participación y desarrollo* (Santiago: RIL, 2013).
2. On geocultural modernity, see Manuel Antonio Garretón, Jesús Martín Barbero, Marcelo Cavarozzi, Nestor García Canclini, Guadalupe Ruiz-Jimenez and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, *El espacio cultural latinoamericano: Bases para una política cultural de integración* (Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003).
3. See the discussion about 'political modernity' in the Introduction to this volume and also in Garretón, *La Sociedad en que vivi(re)mos*, and Garretón, *Incomplete Democracy*.
4. See Garretón et al., *Latin America in the 21st Century*.
5. On this concept, see Jorge Graciarena and Rolando Franco, *Formaciones sociales y estructuras de poder en América Latina* (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1981).
6. Gino Germani, *Política y sociedad en una época de transición. De la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de masas* (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1965); Alain Touraine, *La parole et le sang. Politique et société en Amérique Latine* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1988).
7. On authoritarian and military regimes in the last part of the twentieth century in Latin America, see Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State', *Latin American Research Review* 13, 1 (1978), and *El Estado burocrático autoritario* (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1982).
8. On the Washington consensus, see John Williamson, 'What Washington Means by Policy Reform', in John Williamson (ed.), *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990). On its meaning as the installation of neoliberalism in Latin America, see José Antonio Ocampo, *Más allá del Consenso de Washington: una agenda de desarrollo para América latina* (México DF: CEPAL, 2005).

9. We have referred to these transformations in Garretón, *La Sociedad en que vivi(re)mos* and Garretón, *Incomplete Democracy*.
10. The concepts of human development by the United Nations Development Programme, alter globalisation by the Social Forums and 'buen vivir' by Bolivian and Ecuatorian Constitutions are some examples of these new visions of development in Latin America.
11. See Garretón et al., *El espacio cultural latinoamericano*.
12. Garretón, *Incomplete Democracy*.
13. Wallerstein has called this 'utopistic' instead of 'utopian'. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *Utopística. O las Opciones Históricas del Siglo XXI* (Madrid-México: Siglo XXI Editores and IIS-UNAM, 1998).
14. On the idea of a central movement that embodies the 'central conflict' or problématique of society, see Alain Touraine, *La voix et le regard* (Paris: Seuil, 1978) and *Pourrons nous vivre ensemble? Égaux et différents?* (Paris: Fayard, 1997); and Manuel Antonio Garretón, 'Social Movements and the Process of Democratisation. A General Framework', *International Review of Sociology*, vol. 6, 1 (1996) and 'Las dimensiones de la acción colectiva en América Latina'.
15. On the transitions and democratisations processes in Latin America, see Carlos Barba, José Luis Barros and Javier Hurtado, *Transiciones a la Democracia en Europa y América Latina* (México DF: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 1991); and an overview in Garretón, *Incomplete Democracy*.
16. PNUD, *La democracia en América Latina. Hacia una democracia de ciudadanas y ciudadanos* (Buenos Aires: PNUD, 2004).
17. On mobilisations and non-institutional forms of participation, see Isidoro Cheresky (ed.), *Ciudadanía, sociedad civil y participación política* (Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila Ediciones, 2006); and on participatory democracy experiences, see Maxwell Cameron, Eric Hershberg and Kenneth E. Sharpe, *New Institutions for Participatory Democracy in Latin America: Voice and Consequence* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
18. Indeed 'the people', based on individuals, does not reflect well the idea of 'pueblo', a collectivity in the society with a common destiny based on poor and working sectors, which is the essence of the nation. For a very influential concept of populism, see Ernesto Laclau, *La razón populista* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2004). On diverse experiences of populism, see Jean François Prud'homme, Guy Hermet and Soledad Loaeza (eds), *Del populismo de los antiguos al populismo de los modernos* (México DF: El Colegio de México, 2002).
19. For movements and actors under the dictatorships, democratic transitions and post transitions, see Susan Eckstein, *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
20. For the meaning of human rights violations under military dictatorships and their consequences see Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, *The Legacy of Human Rights Violations in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For

- human rights movements, see Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg (eds), *Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship and Society in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).
21. See the discussion of citizenship in Isidoro Cheresky, *Ciudadanía y legitimidad democrática en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: CLACSO-Prometeo Editores, 2011).
22. For an extensive discussion of the distortions produced by the media logic see Manuel Castells, *Comunicación y poder* (Madrid: Alianza, 2009).
23. Crawford Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
24. On civil society, see Aldo Panfichi (ed.), *Sociedad civil, esfera pública y democratización en América Latina* (México DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003) and Evelina Dagno, Alberto Olvera and Aldo Panfichi (eds), *La disputa por la construcción democrática en América Latina* (México DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006).
25. We have addressed these themes more extensively in Garretón, 'Las dimensiones de la acción colectiva en América Latina'.
26. On the discussion of modernity, see Garretón, *La sociedad en que vivi(re)mos*.
27. About the 2001–12 student mobilisations in Chile, see Fernando Atria, *La mala educación Ideas que inspiran al movimiento estudiantil chileno* (Santiago: Catalonia, 2012); Sergio Gonzalez Rodriguez and Jorge Montealegre (eds), *Ciudadanía en marcha. Educación superior y movimiento estudiantil 2011: curso y lecciones de un conflicto* (Santiago: Editorial USACH, 2012); Jorge Rojas, *Sociedad bloqueada. Movimiento estudiantil, desigualdad y despertar de la sociedad chilena* (Concepción: RIL Editores, 2012). For my own views on 2006 and 2011 mobilisations, see Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Del post pinochetismo a la sociedad democrática. Globalización y Política en el Bicentenario* (Santiago: Random House-Mondadori, 2007) and 'El movimiento estudiantil chileno', *Observatorio del conflicto social* (<http://observatoridelconflictosocial.org>; last accessed 27 June 2015) respectively. These mobilisations differ from the Brazilian 2013 events that can be seen more as a response to the foundational deficit of the Lula governments.
28. For a sociological approach of this vision, see Pedro Morandé, *Cultura y modernización en América Latina* (Santiago de Chile: Cuadernos del Instituto de Sociología Universidad Católica de Chile, 1984). For a complete discussion on the different definitions of Latin American modernity, see Jorge Larraín, *Modernidad, razón e identidad en América Latina* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1996).
29. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, *Ethnic Conflict and the Nation-State* (London: Macmillan, 1996).
30. A synthesis of these perspectives of the social sciences can be found in Helgio Trindade, Gerónimo de Sierra, Manuel Antonio Garretón,